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STATE CONTROL OVER POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: FIRST
AMENDMENT CHECKS ON POWERS OF REGULATION
THE extensive regulatory powers of states over corporations and unincor-
porated associations provide an instrument of untested constitutionality for re-
straining the advocacy of ideas. A state's control may take the form of denying
corporate charters to associations,1 of keeping corporations chartered elsewhere
from functioning within its borders,2 and of subjecting corporations and un-
incorporated associations to registration statutes requiring publication of mem-
bership lists.3 Several states have recently invoked their regulatory powers to
halt the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, a New York corporation engaged in improving rights of Negroes
through the mobilization of public opinion.4 In pursuance of their power to
exclude foreign corporations, Alabama and Texas have permanently enjoined
the NAACP from conducting activities within their jurisdictions. 5 Louisiana
has banned local unincorporated chapters as well as the parent corporation be-
cause of their failure to file membership lists-a requirement that the NAACP
resisted for fear of exposing members to official and private sanctions.6
1. See notes 30-54 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 55-74 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 75-103 infra and accompanying text.
4. The NAACP's legal arm, the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is a
separate corporation from its informative or "political" branch. The Alabama action names
only the NAACP; but in Texas both entities have been enjoined. See decrees cited note
5 infra.
5. Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. NAACP, 15th Jud. Cir., Ala., June 1, 1956, reported
in 1 RAcE RELATIONS L. REP. 707 (1956); Texas v. NAACP, Southern School News,
Nov. 1956, p. 8, cols. 2-5.
The Alabama action was in the nature of a quo warranto suit to oust the NAACP for
acts contrary to public policy such as employment of Negroes to enroll in the University
of Alabama, organization of a boycott to end segregation on busses and failure to register
as a foreign corporation. Since the court enjoined the NAACP not only from conducting
any further business, but also from registering in order to qualify to do business, the action
cannot be construed as one to compel registration. Southern School News, July, 1956,
p. 10, col. 4.
Texas alleged inter alla that the NAACP attempted to register Negroes in schools
segregated in accordance with state law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1956, p. 38, col. 4.
6. Louisiana cx rel. Le Blanc v. Lewis, No. 55899, 19th Jud. K. La., April 24, 1956,
reported in 1 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 571 (1956). See also Southern School News, Dec.
1956, p. 15, col. 4 (after much procedural difficulty the case was permanently removed to
federal district court).
For e.xplanation of the NAACP's objections to filing, see Letter by Roy Wilkins, Exec.
Sec'y of NAACP, to N.Y. Times, June 10, 1.956, § 10; Southern School News, Jan., 1957,
p. 12, col. 2. In New Orleans, where reprisals are less likely to occur, the local branch has
agreed to file its membership lists. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1956, p. 16, col. 4.
Threatened with a similar action in North Carolina, the NAACP applied for a judicial
declaration that it is not required to register under N.C. Gzx. STAT. § 55-118 (Supp. 1955)
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These injunctions constitute a direct restraint on the right to promote a
cause by joint action; because of the significant role which interest groups play
in the dissemination of ideas, the powers of states to impose such restrictions
must be sharply delineated.7 Courts have employed the First Amendment, as
included in the Fourteenth, to nullify other types of state-imposed curtailments
upon the right of individuals to associate and the right of associations to com-
municate.8 Rather than focus exclusively on the merits of the NAACP cases,
this Comment will consider the overall question of the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment undercuts a state's power to impair organized advocacy
by denying corporate charters, excluding foreign corporations, and requiring
disclosure of members of organizations.9
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AS "PERSONS" ENTITLED TO FREE SPEECH
Any limitations that may exist on state powers over organizations engaged
in influencing public opinion must rest on the assumption that the Fourteenth
Amendment endows such organizations with the right of free speech. Freedom
of speech and of the press are incorporated in the word "liberty" of the Four-
teenth Amendment's provision that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."0 Although courts have
(foreign corporation statute) and id. §§ 120-48 to 55 (membership lists required of all or-
ganizations influencing legislation and public opinion). NAACP v. Eure, Sup. Ct. N.C.,
March 12, 1956, reported in 1. RAcE RELATIONS L. REP. 405 (1956).
Alabama has sought membership lists through a bill of discovery to determine whether
the NAACP is doing business in that state. Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. NAACP, N.Y.
Times, July 26, 1956, p. 11., cols. 1-4 ($10,000 fine for willful contempt in failing to produce
membership lists). The fine, later raised to $100,000, was upheld by the Alabama Supreme
Court. Id., Dec. 7, 1956, p. 22, col. 6.
In Georgia production of records containing the names of members of the NAACP was
compelled for a tax investigation. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
Other Southern states are contemplating restrictive measures against the NAACP. See
Southern School News, Jan. 1957, p. 1, col. 3. Events occurring after January 12, 1957, are
not covered by this Comment.
7. See note 37 infra. and accompanying text. Political scientists have stressed the in-
effectiveness of uncoordinated action by individuals in a complex political process. See
HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 14-15 (1956); LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN
STATE 130 (1934) ; Schlessinger, Sr., Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am. HIST.
REV. 1 (1,944).
8. E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (punishment for participating in
non-violent meeting under auspices of organization advocating violence held unconstitu-
tional) ; Grosjein v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (taxing to curtail activities
of newspaper corporation held unconstitutional).
9. This Comment will not discuss political parties and the powers of states to regulate
such activities as primaries and party contributions.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. All freedoms protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states. Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum; speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (religion) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly) ; Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press).
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always held corporations to be "persons" entitled to protection of property,"
three early cases, none of which involved a free speech issue, stated that the
guarantee of liberty extends only to natural persons. 12 Even while creating this
dichotomy, however, the Supreme Court protected the "liberty" of an educa-
tional corporation by stretching the meaning of "property."'1 3 And in Grosean
v. American Press Co.' 4 the Court accorded the guarantee of freedom of press
to a newspaper corporation inhibited by state regulation. This ruling has been
followed in a number of cases concerning the communications industry ;15 in
11. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) ; Kentucky Finance Corp.
v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923) ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 522 (1898). But see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (dis-
senting opinion by Douglas, J.) ; Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77,
83, 85 (1938) (dissenting opinion by Black, J.).
Corporations are not citizens within the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) ; Orient Ins. Co. v.
Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
Corporations are also "persons" entitled to equal protection of the laws. Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) ; Santa Clara County v. Southern P.R.R., 118 U.S.
394 (1877). But cf. Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (municipal corporations) ;
Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923) (same). This affords little protection to foreign
corporations, however, because they are not "within the jurisdiction" and entitled to equal
protection until they qualify to do business there. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U.S. 494 (1926) ; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921) ; Sully v.
American Nat'l Bank, 178 U.S. 289 (1900) ; Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260 (1898) ;
Nugent v. Brown, 315 Pa. 345, 173 A.2d 177 (1934). But see Kentucky Finance Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923) (not qualified to do business but
held entitled to equal protection when entered state to replevin property). Accordingly the
Supreme Court has held that a license tax that is a prerequisite to admission of a corpora-
tion to a state cannot be challenged on equal protection grounds, while a tax imposed upon
a corporation which already has the right to do business in a state can be attacked. Han-
over Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra; Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 396 (1909).
12. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (educational corporation
not entitled to "liberty") ; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907)
(business corporation, same) ; Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255
(1906). In Northwestern Justice Harlan cited no precedent; in Western Turf he cited
Northwestern.
13. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). An Oregon statute requir-
ing all children to attend public school was held to deprive a private institution of its
property without due process of law. Although such a statute is on its face a denial of
liberty, the property clause was invoked, thus bypassing the two Harlan decisions, note 12
supra. For a suggestion that the right to free speech by a radio station or the right to free
press by a newspaper might be protected as a property right, see Note, 48 HARv. L. REV.
507 (1935).
14. 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
15. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion picture corporation);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (newspaper corporation); Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (same). The issue of whether the corporation was a "person"
was not discussed by the majority in any of the above cases. Justice Frankfurter, dissent-
ing in Bridges at 281, stated inter alia that corporations cannot claim liberty and that the
majority was "strangely silent" on the issue. But see Pennekamp v. Florida, supra (con-
curring opinion).
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one the Court granted a motion picture corporation protection under the guar-
antee of freedom of speech as well as freedom of the press.' 6 These opinions do
not reveal whether the Court has completely abandoned the restrictive definition
of "person" or has merely carved out an exception for newspapers and motion
pictures. Although Grosfean suggests that corporations are entitled to all the
safeguards of the due process clause,17 a political organization's right to free
speech may still be in doubt as a result of the decision in Hague v. CIO,",
the last Supreme Court case explicitly treating this issue.
In Hague the Supreme Court completely obscured the status of organiza-
tions under the "liberty" clause. An unincorporated association, its officers
and a corporation sought to enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordinance on
grounds that it violated their right of free speech. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the association and the corporation as parties. Two Justices of the
seven-man Court held that the organizations were not "citizens" entitled to
privileges and immunities ;19 two others held, without distinguishing Grosiean,
that the organizations had no right of free speech under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.20 But the Court permitted the officers of the association to maintain the
action; the ordinance was declared unconstitutional on its face, even though it
had apparently prevented the officers only from conducting activities on behalf
of the association.21 Subsequent cases have also granted Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection to individuals- speaking in their capacity as agents of unincor-
porated associations.
22
The rationale underlying these holdings, that agents are natural persons
vested with the right of free speech by the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to
the agents of corporations as well.2 3 This rationale, however, renders the view
that corporations and associations are not "persons" meaningless: since or-
ganizations can speak only through their agents, denial of free speech to or-
16. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
17. 297 U.S. at 244: "But a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the equal
protection and due process of law clauses, which are the clauses involved here." For this
proposition the Court cited cases involving deprivations of property and ignored the cases
establishing a contrary rule for deprivations of liberty. See cases cited note 12 supra.
18. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
19. Id. at 514. These Justices did not reach the due process question.
20. Id. at 527. The Justices relied on the three cases holding that corporations were
not "persons" entitled to liberty, see note 12 supra, and did not even cite Grosjean.
21. The individual respondents were restrained from "labor organization activities"
including distribution of printed matter and the holding of public meetings. 307 U.S. at
501-02.
22. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (organizer of union); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (union picketer).
23. It may be argued that an association is juristically the sum of its members, all of
whom are persons entitled to "liberty," and therefore the association has the right of free
speech. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 150-52, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). This
interpretation is negated by Hague, however, which treated the unincorporated association
as a fictional person along with the American Civil Liberties Union, the corporation dis-
missed from the case.
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ganizations is ineffective if their individual agents are still protected.24 Courts
must interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in one of two ways: either an asso-
ciation or corporation is not a person entitled to free speech and its agents act-
ing in an official capacity cannot claim protection; or such organizations are
persons entitled to free speech protection, and the organizations as well as their
individual agents, have standing to enforce this right.25
From the standpoint of constitutional ikiterpretation and public policy, the
construction that organizations have a right of free speech is preferable. The
history of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals no intent to define "person"
differently for protecting property than for protecting liberty.26 From a policy
perspective, the First Amendment's object of an open political process cannot
be realized unless organizations are considered persons entitled to liberty. Thus
a recognition that there would be no freedom of press without protection of
newspaper corporations must underlie the Grosiean decision. 27 Similarly, in
24. The holding remains as a procedural limitation on the corporation's capacity to
sue, however. In some cases it may be necessary for the corporation rather than its agents
to maintain a suit. For example, assume that a state confiscates allegedly obscene books of
a corporation. The individual agents of the corporation have no property rights in the
books and hence cannot sue. A similar situation exists where the corporation is fined for
publishing the book. But in both of these cases the sanction takes the form of a deprivation
of property, and thus the corporation, a person for protection of property, would be able
to claim that the abridgment of speech constituted a denial of due process. See notes 11.
and 13 supra and accompanying text.
25. A more consistent approach is taken in Fifth Amendment cases. A corporation
cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Courts have imple-
mented this rule by holding that corporate officers cannot refuse to produce corporate
documents in their custody on grounds that they might incriminate themselves and the cor-
,poration. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (president of union) ; Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (president of corporation). The courts have realized
that the denial of the privilege against self-incrimination to corporations could be defeated
if officers acting in their official capacity could assert the privilege. See Wilson v. United
States, supra at 384-85.
Significantly, however, the denial of the privilege against self-incrimination rests not
on the theory that corporations are not "persons" within the Fifth Amendment, but on the
assumption that the privilege was meant to protect individuals from forced disclosure
26. There has been considerable historical debate as to whether corporations are "per-
sons." The courts, however, have resolved the issue insofar as corporations are entitled
to property and equal protection of the laws. See note 11 supra. A review of the history
of the drafting of the amendment reveals no indication that some "persons" were to be
entitled to property and not to liberty. On the contrary, draftsmen stated that the amend-
ment was to protect "natural and inherent rights'"-a philosophy which points up "life,
liberty, and property" as a bundle of rights as opposed to three separate protections for
three types of "persons." Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment,
47 YALE L.J. 371, 397 (1937), 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938) ; FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1903); TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION (1911).
27. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. In 1937, the year after the Grosjean
decision, it was reported that three-fourths of the publishers of daily and Sunday news-
papers in the United States were corporate entities. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 151-52,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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view of the large number of incorporated and unincorporated pressure groups,28
political organizations, as well as their individual members, must be protected
if the political process is to be free from state restraint. Political organizations
-corporations or unincorporated associations-should therefore be allowed to
invoke First Amendment safeguards through the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
It must then be seen to what extent the right of free speech limits a state's
exercise of regulatory powers.
THE RIGHT TO INCORPORATE
The common law view of unincorporated associations was not conducive to
their growth and efficient operation. Not recognized as legal entities, associa-
tions could not hold and convey property or sue in their own name.30 Rather,
property could be maintained only by cumbersome procedures of joint or trus-
tee ownership ;31 and except in equity all members had to join as parties in
order to bring suit.A2 In addition, expansion of membership was restricted by
the risk of personal liability for debts incurred by associations. 33 Midway
through the nineteenth century, commercial units demanded a form of organi-
zation that would both limit liability of investors and facilitate the conduct of
business.34 Incorporation, which had hitherto been granted sparingly, fulfilled
these needs and has become the dominant form of commercial organization. 3r
Associations that engage to a substantial extent in influencing public opinion
have tended to follow the example of business units. Thus, even where statutes
28. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (1) confers capacity to sue and be sued on unincorporated
associations "for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . ." But even before the adoption of
this provision, the Supreme Court held that unions were to be considered entities for the
purpose of suits governed by federal law. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344, 391 (1922). See International Longshoremen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F.
Supp. 65, 122-23 (D. Hawaii 1949) (unincorporated union considered "person" entitled to
free speech; Hague not followed), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951).
30. Right to hold property: 3 AmiFaIcAN LAW OF PROPEarr § 12.78 (Casner ed. 1954
Supp.); WRIGHTINGTON, UNINcORPORATED AssociTioNS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS 336-37
(2d ed. 1923).
Right to sue: Nightingale v. Barney, 4 IoWa 106 (1853) (Masonic lodge) ; Pickett v.
Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906) (trade union); Maisch v. Order of Americans,
223 Pa. 199, 72 AtI. 528 (1909) ; WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra at 425-36.
31. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.50 (Casner ed. 1954 Supp.).
32. WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra note 30, at 425-26. In equity, a suit brought by
members on behalf of themselves and other members of the class united in interest could
be maintained. Id. at 430.
33. Members of unincorporated associations are personally liable for the debts of the
association on agency grounds. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 62 Cal. App. 2d 653,
145 P.2d 722 (1944) ; Hale v. Hirsch, 205 App. Div. 308, 199 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1st Dep't
1923) ; see Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951) (common law modified
by statute) ; WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra note 30, at 282-390.
34. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10-17 (1932).
35. Id. at 17.
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have removed some of the common law disabilities of unincorporated associa-
tions, 36 political organizations have chosen the corporate form. As a result of
this movement, a basic layer of the political process is now composed of in-
corporated pressure groups.
3 7
Although barriers to incorporation have been eliminated for commercial en-
terprises, they still exist for political associations. Traditionally, incorporation
has been regarded as a privilege that a state may grant or deny on its own
terms.38 Competing with one another to attract industry, states have made this
privilege readily available to businesses.39 Thus all states have general incor-
poration laws that permit commercial enterprises to incorporate by complying
substantially with easily-met statutory standards.40 But in many states non-
profit associations are subject to special incorporation laws that vest adminis-
trative officials or judges with discretion to deny incorporation.41 Although no
36. Right to sue: e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7797 (1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A-64-1
(Supp. 1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-66 (Supp. 1956).
Right to hold property: e.g., N.Y. MEMBmSHIP CORP. LAW § 21 (court approval neces-
sary for sale) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2851-308 (Purdon 1955) (approval by majority
of members necessary to acquire and dispose of realty). But many such statutes are not
board enough to cover political associations. E.g., WVo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 44-907
(Supp. 1955) (excepts political associations).
Although statutes have not conferred limited liability upon members of unincorporated
nonprofit associations, the common law, which requires that a creditor prove that the mem-
ber sought to be charged had authorized the debt-producing act, has operated as a func-
tional substitute. See BALLANTINE, CoRu'oRArioNs § 2a (rev. ed. 1946).
37. For example, the national organization or local chapters of the American Legion,
Veterans of Foreign Wars, National Association of Manufacturers, American Civil Liber-
ties Union and NAACP are incorporated.
38. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 441 (1893) (business corporation) ; Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State, 214 Cal. 369, 375, 6 P.2d 78, 81 (1931) (same) ; see Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 544-45, 548 (1933) (dissenting opinion by Brandeis, J.) (same);
HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-35 (1918).
39. "The race was not one of diligence but of laxity. Incorporation under such laws
was possible and the great independent states yielded in order not to lose wholly the pros-
pect of revenue and the control incident to domestic incorporation." Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 557 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. 1 P-H CORP. SERv. 1 1102; see BE.RJE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 135-38.
Limiting standards such as maximum authorized capital no longer exist in incorporation
laws, 1 P-H CORP. SERV. 1111 9001-51, although this was once a universal requirement,
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 550 (1933) (dissenting opinion). At most
some states require a minimum capital to begin business, e.g., FLA. GEN. CORP. LAW
§ 603.03(d) (Supp. 1956) ($500).
41. Discretion in Courts: GA. CODE ANN. § 22-203 (Supp. 1955); ML REv. STAT.
ANN. c. 54, § 1 (Supp. 1955) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.060 (Supp. 1956) ; N.Y. MEMBER-
smop CORP. LAW § 10; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2851-207 (Purdon 1955); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13-222 (Supp. 1956).
Discretion in Administrative Officials: IOWA CODE ANN. § 504.1 (Supp. 1956) ; MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 180, § 5 (Supp. 1955); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5310 (Supp. 1954).
Most of the cases denying incorporation to nonprofit associations have arisen under the
New York and Pennsylvania statutes. E.g., in re Voters Alliance for Americans of Ger-
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
meaningful statutory standards exist,42 two vague criteria for exercising this
power have developed: the principles of an association must be in accord with
public policy,43 and the association must not conduct activities that are adequate-
ly performed by other organizations.44
The constitutionality of holding political associations to these two require-
ments may be questioned. Certainly, a state is not obligated to establish a
privilege of incorporation for the class of political associations. But once any
privilege is established for a class, its denial to any member of that class may
constitute a denial of equal protection of law unless the distinction has a reason-
able foundation. 45 Thus, to allow the privilege of incorporation to some political
associations precludes a state from arbitrarily denying that privilege to others.
Furthermore, the denial may be an abridgment of free speech if the discrimi-
nation cannot be justified by a "substantial public purpose. ' 46 For denial of
man Ancestry, 64 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Citizens League of Whitfield, 65 Pa. D.
& C. 70 (C.P. 1949). See Note, 55 CoLUm. L. REv. 380 (1955).
Political associations may encounter difficulty in incorporating even under general in-
corporation statutes. The standard provision extends incorporation to persons organizing
to conduct "any lawful business" and thus equips officials with the power to deny incor-
poration to associations engaging in activities against the public policy of the state. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (Supp. 1955) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5151 (1949). Thus
action is still pending on the application of an organization with purposes similar to the
ousted NAACP for incorporation in Alabama as the Guiding Voice, Inc. Southern School
News, July, 1956, p. 9, col. 2.
42. Where provided at all, statutory standards are in the most general terms. E.g.,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 352.060 (Supp. 1956) (applicant's purpose in incorporating must be law-
ful and publicly useful) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2851-207 (Purdon 1955) (purpose must
be lawful and not injurious to community) ; S.C. CODE 12-756 (Supp. 1956) (applicant
must not operate in violation of law).
43. In re Mazzini Cultural Center, 185 Misc. 1031, 58 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
In re Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n, 53 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (group seeking to
amend constitution to provide for forfeiture of citizenship by anyone distributing matter
advocating violent overthrow denied charter) ; In re Incorporation of Nat'l Legion of Am.
People, 38 Luzerne L.R. Rep. 78 (Pa. 1944) (charter denied because applicant did not
specify the political or economic -philosophy it wished to disseminate).
44. Denials: In re Marine Corps Veterans Foundation, 79 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct.
1948) (organization seeking to increase loyalty) ; In re Voters Alliance for Americans
of German Ancestry, 64 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (organization to educate in political
thinking). Most of the cases using this rationale, however, deal with associations that are
nonpolitical. E.g., Application of Knesseth Harabonin D'America, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 543
(Sup. Ct. 1954) (orthodox rabbinical organization); Matter of Waldemar Cancer Re-
search Ass'n, 205 Misc. 560, 130 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1.954) (charitable organization);
In re Animal Protective & Rescue League, 84 Pa. D. & C. 537 (C.P. 1954).
45. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (denial of use of public park held un-
constitutional) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (same).
46. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). The Court up-
held the denial of the privilege of using the NLRB to unions whose officers refused to sign
non-Communist affidavits. The Court, however, refused to accept the government's argu-
ment that the denial of a privilege could never constitute an abridgment of the First
Amendment. Id. at 390. Instead the Court recognized that denial of NLRB facilities is a
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incorporation has the effect of placing the rejected applicant at a serious com-
petitive disadvantage with incorporated associations. 47 Fear of unlimited per-
sonal liability may keep persons from joining the unincorporated association ;4s
lack of capacity to sue or hold property may weaken the organization finan-
significant burden for a union, and that as a result the non-Communist affidavit require-
ment would exert pressure on individuals in union leadership positions to abandon belief
in Communism. Id. at 404. But the Court found the requirement constitutional because
the need for regulation affecting interstate commerce outweighed the effect of the require-
ment upon the right to free speech. Id. at 411. The Court also stressed the rational con-
nection between the purpose of denying the NLRB's facilities to Communists and the pur-
pose of the NLRB itself. For denial of the privilege of invoking the NLRB's help to
unions whose officers are likely to engender political strikes subserves the privilege's pur-
pose of promoting the free flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 404-06. See also United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (ban against political activities for govern-
ment employees upheld; Court deferred to legislative determination that active political
partisanship was inconsistent with an efficient civil service); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946) (dictum that Congress does not have unfettered power to dis-
criminate in the award of the second class mail privilege).
In the above cases the Supreme Court departed completely from the approach suggested
by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), that
a discriminatory award of privileges would never be vulnerable to constitutional attack
because "petitioner ... has no constitutional right to be a policeman." The only recent case
reflecting this view is Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) where in up-
holding a denial of public employment the Court stated in dictum that petitioners are "at
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere." Soon thereafter, however,
the Supreme Court abandoned this rationale to circumscribe denials of public employment
with the requirement of scienter. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). For dis-
cussion of privilege cases, see Wilcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Con-
ditioncd Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1945).
47. Burdens need not be prohibitive to abridge the First Amendment. See, e.g., Han-
negan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (denied special mail rate) ; Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (payment of license fee of $1.50 per day to solicit) ; Mil-
waukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430-31. (1921) (dissent) (special mail
rate) ; cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (denied privi-
leges of NLRB).
48. Fear of personal liability for the debts of nonprofit associations is very often
groundless. See note 36 supra. Nevertheless, unincorporated organization is so identified
with unlimited liability that associations that can offer limited liability have a considerable
advantage. Members of nonprofit corporations are not personally liable for debts of the
corporation under many state statutes. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 352.120 (Supp. 1956) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2851-610 (Purdon 1955). In absence of such statutes there is
doubt as to whether limited liability exists, especially in view of the small capitalization of
nonprofit corporations. See Larson, Comparison of Characteristics of Corporate and Un-
incorporated Nonprofit Associations, in 1951 REP. OF N.Y. LAw RvisioN Comu'N 441.
A recent development attests to the disadvantages of unincorporated status. The growth
of investment clubs is apparently being stunted by fear of unlimited liability. In many
cases persons have been advised that they may be held liable for the personal debts of other
members. See letter from Thomas E. O'Hara, Chairman, Board of Trustees, National
Ass'n of Investment Clubs, to the Yale Law Journal, Oct. 18, 1956, on file in Yale Law
Library.
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cially.4 9 The two standards traditionally used to deny incorporation must there-
fore be measured against the requirement of a substantial public purpose50
The objective of the first standard-conditioning incorporation on public
approval of the principles advanced by an association-is to 'discourage the
advocacy of ideas deemed offensive to the community. At most, however, the
First Amendment permits a state to discourage the advocacy of ideas that are
libelous, obscene, seditious or imminently provocative of serious violation of
law.51 Accordingly, a state may not base a denial of incorporation on dis-
approval of ideas that do not come within this category.52 The second standard,
denying corporate charters if other political corporations are performing the
49. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. Not all states have eliminated these
disabilities. 3 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.78 (Casner ed. 1954 Supp.).
50. If a political association is applying for incorporation, it should be allowed to at-
tack a denial of the privilege as a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. See notes
10-29 supra and accompanying text. If a previously unassociated group seeks incorpora-
tion, its individual members should be allowed to challenge a refusal to incorporate as a
restriction on their right to speech." Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 571-72 (1942) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 1159, 1178 n.99 (1956).
The Supreme Court has distinguished sharply between discriminations against partic-
ular ideas and discriminations that cut across all beliefs. Thus in upholding the ban on all
political activities for government employees, the Court accepted counsel's argument that
Congress may not "enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall
be appointed to federal office.. . ." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100
(1947). Congress or a state may discriminate against the same beliefs that they may punish,
except that in the case of punishment imminence of danger from the advocacy must be
shown. Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (privilege of residence
may be denied to aliens belonging to organization advocating violent overthrow of govern-
ment), American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding denial
of use of NLRB to members of the organization) and Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding denial of public employment to members of same organi-
zation), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding punishment of per-
sons combining to advocate violent overthrow of government). Compare also Public Clear-
ing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 507 (1904) (dictum; obscene literature may be denied
postal privilege), with New York v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947),
aff'd by eqzally divided Court, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (upholding criminal sanctions against
disseminators of obscenity), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum:
"the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications"). The
Supreme Court has also allowed punishment of persons uttering libelous statements about
a race or religion, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and persons making public
addresses which incite to riot, Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321, (1950) ; Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941). Cf., Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d
538 (4th Cir. 1950) (upholding employer's ban on union newspaper libelous to employers).
52. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952) (profanity pro-
tected from prior restraint) ; Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192-94 (1952) (con-
curring opinion) (state may not deny public employment to members of certain associa-
tions) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (state may not deny use of park be-
cause of religious belief) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (dictum that
second class mail privilege may not be denied because of official's view that publication did
not contribute to the public good) ; cf. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
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same function, can never be sustained. Unlike the public approval standard,
the object of this criterion is to limit the number of corporations advocating
particular ideas, not to discourage the dissemination of offensive ideasY3 But
while restriction of economic competitors may be a legitimate purpose of in-
corporation laws,54 restriction of competitors in the political process is totally
inconsistent with the First Amendment's goal of a free market place of ideas.
Therefore, denial of incorporation to a political association merely because cor-
porations with identical principles are in existence is an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the guarantee of free speech, and in addition a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law.
EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
While a local association which has been denied a corporate charter may
continue to operate in unincorporated form, exclusion of an association that has
been incorporated elsewhere precludes all its activities within the stateY5 The
doctrinal justification for the power to exclude is that a corporation is an arti-
407, 431 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (second class mail privilege may not be denied
because of Postmaster General's dislike of views).
A statute may be unconstitutional on its face if it affords officials the opportunity to
discriminate against specific ideas. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1950) (denied
permit for street meetings to prevent disorder) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (license for public solicitation) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 1147 (1939) (pro-
hibited handbill distribution to keep streets clean).
53. Indeed, the court may argue that the denial of incorporation strengthens the
advocacy of a particular program:
"There are already a number of well established, respectable and representative
veteran organizations performing all of the things that are proposed to be performed
by this certificate of incorporation. By joining one of the already existing veteran
organizations, the incorporators could more effectively and expediently accomplish
their aims."
In re Marine Corps Veterans Foundation, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
54. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 592-93 (1839) (state may
protect local monopoly by excluding competitors incorporated elsewhere) ; HENDERSON,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 21 (old view was that incorporation contemplated monopoly).
But see Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548, 553 (1933) (dissenting opinion)
(incorporation laws used to prevent monopoly, e.g., by limiting amount of capital).
In New York Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), the Court held that a state
may not restrict competition by requiring a license to engage in business not affected with
the public interest. No occasion has arisen for reconciling the rationale for denying cor-
porate charters with this decision. For under general incorporation laws businesses are
freely incorporated. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
Restricting the number of charitable organizations serving the same cause may be
necessary to maximize success. For the public may be confused or irritated 'by the solicita-
tions of a number of apparently indistinguishable charities. E.g., Matter of Waldemar
Cancer Research Ass'n, 205 Misc. 560, 130 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; In re Animal
Protective and Rescue League, 84 Pa. D. & C. 537 (C.P. 1952).
55. All states possess the power to exclude. National Council United Am. Mechanics
v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151 (1.906) ; Kansas ex rel. Griffith v. Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan.
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ficial creation of local law which the foreign state is not bound to recognize
under the rules of comity.5" Logically applied, this rationale would only au-
thorize stripping a foreign corporation of the legal attributes of the corporate
status. The agents of the unrecognized foreign corporation could be treated as
principals or agents of an unincorporated association, and in either capacity
permitted to conduct activities within the state. Nevertheless, the power to
exclude has always been interpreted as the broad power to keep agents of the
excluded corporation from conducting any activities within the state. 7 As a
result, when a political association is excluded, a prior restraint, the most ex-
treme form of First Amendment abridgment, occurs ;5s the organization is
denied the right to be heard, not merely punished for what it says. Thus any
agent of the NAACP who addressed a meeting in Alabama or Texas, the states
564, 232 Pac. 254 (1925) ; Ku Klux Klan v. Virginia, 138 Va. 500, 122 S.E. 122 (1924).
In most of the cases, however, the power is relied upon by a state in order to support some
conditions which the state is imposing. E.g., Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207
(1945) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936) ; Washington ex rel. Bond
v. Superior Ct., 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
For a discussion of the power to exclude, see HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 38; Mer-
rill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
73 (1951) ; Note, 79 U. PA. L. Rav. 956, 1119, 1129 (1931).
56. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) ; HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 38, at 36-49. The better view
is that the corporate entity is merely a fiction which is useful for some purposes such as
amenability to suit, but which should be disregarded when policy considerations demand.
Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1943) (dictum); Schmid v. First Camden
Nat'l Bank, 130 N.J. Eq. 254, 22 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1941) (dictum); see Latty, The Corporate
Enterprise as a Solvent to Legal Problems, 34 MicH. L. REv. 597 (1936). But opinions
rarely articulate the policy considerations that justify exclusion. See, e.g., Magna Oil &
Refining Co. v. White Star Refining Co., 280 Fed. 52 (3d Cir. 1922) ; F. E. Nugent Funeral
Home, Inc. v. Beamish, 315 Pa. 345, 173 AtI. 177 (1-934). But cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
57. Historically, power to exclude was used to protect local monopolies from foreign
competition. The object of exclusion, therefore, was to keep out foreign enterprises al-
together, not merely to confer a competitively disadvantageous unincorporated status on
them. HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 38, at 101-02.
Moreover, even if a state were satisfied to allow an unincorporated enterprise to do
business locally there would be insuperable jurisdictional barriers to effectively disregard-
ing a foreign corporate form. For example, if the shareholders reside out of state, they
could not be held personally liable as members of an unincorporated association unless their
state paradoxically honored the excluding state's nonrecognition of the corporate form.
Furthermore, while nonrecognition of corporations does not violate the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution, one commentator has suggested that refusal to recognize
an attribute of a corporation that is derived from the incorporation of another state, such
as limited liability, would be a violation. Holt, Full Faith and Credit-A Suggested
Approach to the Problem of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 478-79 (1941).
58. Exclusion works a greater restraint than what has been labeled a prior restraint
in other cases because it is a bar to all operations and not merely to a phase of operations
as in, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (prohibition of loudspeakers) ; Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (prohibition of handbills); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941) (restriction on parades).
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from which the association was ousted by court injunction, would be subject
to criminal contempt.59 Moreover, local incorporation laws offer no realistic
escape from this prior restraint. For political associations excluded from a
state on public policy grounds have little chance of obtaining local charters ;60
and even if they did, the costs of multiple incorporation might be prohibitive. 61
Although not all prior restraints are forbidden by the First Amendment,
6 2
59. See decrees cited note 5 supra. The lack of a sure ritual for shedding agency re-
lationship may result in the abridgment of the right of persons associated with the NAACP
to speak in their individual capacities. Intention of the parties is the basis of an agency
relationship. MEcHE, AGENCY § 30 (2d ed. 1941). But stated intention need not be con-
trolling, for a court may conclude that a disclaimer of agency was a subterfuge. Cf. Darker
v. Colby, 375 Ill. 558,31 N.E.2d 950 (1941) (formal contract for relationship as independent
contractors disregarded by court in finding agency relationship). Thus in determining
whether a speaker is really acting as agent for an excluded corporation, courts may logical-
ly look to the content of his speeches. Accordingly, if members or employees of an ex-
cluded corporation speak in their individual capacity on causes promoted by the corpora-
tion, they risk being found to have acted as agents and punished for contempt. Faced with
this danger, individuals must either remain silent in the excluding state, or resign member-
ship or employment in the excluded corporation: a choice which is repugnant to freedom
of speech.
60. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text. The application for inconporation
of an organization with purposes similar to that of the NAACP is pending in Alabama.
See note 41 supra. Even if the denial of incorporation would be unconstitutional, a state
may avoid the adjudication by delaying action on the application. Cf. Note, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 974 (1956) (establishment of administrative tribunal to delay federal review).
61. A state may require a foreign corporation to incorporate locally in order to do
intrastate business within its borders. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S.
440 (1931). While the cost of incorporating in one other state may be insignificant, costs
loom large when a corporation does a nationwide business. Thus the Supreme Court has
held that if a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce, it would be an unconstitu-
tional burden upon such commerce to require local incorporation. Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, supra; Dahnke-Walker 'Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921.).
Similarly it would seem that the exercise of free speech is abridged by requiring a political
corporation engaged in nationwide activities to bear the burden of incorporation in another
state. Cf. AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1945).
Moreover if the court finds that a foreign corporation is a "person" within the Four-
teenth Amendment, see notes 10-29 supra and accompanying text, it should be entitled in
that capacity to freedom from prior restraint. Accordingly, it is arguable on doctrinal
grounds that a state violates the free speech guarantee when it admits a foreign corporation
only on condition that it then become a local corporation. For the foreign and domestic
corporations are separate entities and although the domestic "person" would be free to con-
duct First Amendment activities, its foreign alter ego would not. The Supreme Court has
ruled, however, that a foreign corporation required to incorporate locally retains its foreign
capacity for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, supra; Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326 (1903). See Note, 44 HARv. L. REv.
428 (1931). Similarly, when faced with a prior restraint argument, the court might rule
that a foreign corporation admitted as a domestic corporation is functioning within the
state.
62. Advocacy of particular ideas may be restrained, but there is little case law precise-
ly defining this area. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931.) (dictum) which
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
exclusion of a political corporation will rarely meet the strict requirements of
constitutionality. First, prior restraints must be imposed pursuant to a clearly
defined statutory standard.63 In most states, however, the only administrative
guide for determining whether to exclude foreign corporations is the adminis-
trator's conception of public policy.6 4 Secondly, a prior restraint can be upheld
only if a substantial public purpose will be served and if a less restrictive
abridgment is not available.65 If subsequent punishment would serve the same
purpose, the advocate must be given the opportunity to speak ;60 or if a lesser
prior restraint would accomplish the same end, the greater restraint is uncon-
stitutional. 67 The alleged purpose for excluding political corporations has usual-
permits restraint of advocacy that obstructs the war effort, or is obscene or seditious;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum) which permits pre-
vention and punishment of "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace." Prior restraint of profanity has been denied. Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Prior restraint of wartime speech and
obscenity have never been passed on. Cf. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(subsequent punishment of speech interfering with war effort) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, supra (avoided obscenity point). On sedition see Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (dictum; ban of organization
advocating violent overthrow), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955) ; ef. Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (subsequunt punishment of advocacy of violent over-
throw).
An exception to the proscription of prior restraints has also developed where there is
no discrimination against specific ideas and the restraint is necessary to the proper alloca-
tion and use of a privilege. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1.948) (dictum; hours and
place of use of sound trucks) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (traffic con-
trol). These restraints actually enhance efficient communication.
See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 648 (1955).
63. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951) ; Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
64. Some states exclude on the basis of foreign corporation statutes, but the standards,
if ankr, are very vague. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 22-1502 (Supp. 1955) ("no foreign cor-
poration shall exercise within this state any corporate power or privilege which is contrary
to the public policy of the state") ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 17-503 (1949) ("organized for a
purpose for which a domestic corporation may be formed"), Kansas ex rel. Griffith v. Ku
Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232 Pac. 254 (1925).
When exclusion is derived from common law, only the vague concept of public policy
guides its use. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 591-92 (1839) ; National
Council United Am. Mechanics v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151 (1906).
65. E.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) ; Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941.). See Comment, 65
YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
66. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1950) (subsequent punishment ade-
quate) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same).
67. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (state may protect public
from annoyance of solicitors, but solicitors may only be forbidden from approaching those
individuals who indicate they are unwilling to be disturbed).
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ly been the prevention of illegality and violence. 68 Even if a state could restrain
advocacy of unlawful conduct, 69 exclusion of a political corporation ordinarily
restrains advocacy of lawful conduct as well. For, as in the case of the NAACP,
most political associations urge policies that a state does not or could not con-
tend are illegal. 0 Since a less restrictive but functionally equivalent abridg-
ment would be to admit the corporation and then to enjoin any unlawful
advocacy, the broader restraint of exclusion is unconstitutional.
Moreover, the traditional policy rationale for the exclusionary power yields
no justification for the prior restraint of political associations. In upholding
state regulation of foreign commercial corporations, the Supreme Court has
stressed that a state must have the exclusionary power to maintain the integrity
of its incorporation laws ;T1 in the absence of this power, persons could circum-
vent a prohibitive local incorporation law by obtaining a charter from another
state. This rationale, however, is of limited utility in justifying the exclusion
of political associations, for once a state makes incorporation available to one
association, its power to deny incorporation to other associations is greatly
restricted.72 And if a state cannot refuse to incorporate an association, ex-
clusion of that association as a foreign corporation cannot be considered essen-
tial for the preservation of local policy. But even if the circumstances were
such that a state could constitutionally deny local incorporation to the foreign
corporation, 73 the interest in maintaining local incorporation policy appears too
insubstantial to justify a prior restraint of free speech.74
68. Kansas ex rel. Griffith v. Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 568, 232 Pac. 254, 256
(1925) (findings of threats and intimidation of public) ; cf. Ku Klux Klan v. Virginia, 138
Va. 500, 122 S.E. 122 (1924). The basis of the action against the NAACP was that the
organization encouraged violation of segregation laws. The failure of the NAACP to
register does not seem to be the essence of the complaint since the NAACP was also en-
joined from registration. See note 5 supra.
69. See note 51 supra.
70. Inasmuch as segregation is unconstitutional, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (busses) ; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a state should not
be able to restrain advocacy of integration.
71. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) ; see Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 737 (1950) ; cf. KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17-503 (1949) (a foreign corporation must be organized for a purpose for which a
domestic corporation could be organized). The policy of protecting local incorporation
laws antedates the "race of laxity," note 39 supra. But since this race is long over, and
relatively slight and uniform restrictions on incorporation now exist, see note 40 supra,
this policy is no longer a valid one.
72. See notes 30-54 supra and accompanying text.
73. Apart from circumstances under which discrimination against an organization
might be constjtutional, see notes 51, 52 supra and accompanying text, a denial would be
constitutional if states denied the privilege of incorporation to political associations as a
class.
74. The substantiality of purpose necessary to justify a restraint upon free speech
depends on the extent of the restraint. Most cases deal with partial restraints. E.g., Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (protection of peace and order of community from
violence or disorder which may result from speech does not justify restraint on public
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IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS
Registration statutes that require local and foreign political associations to
publish their membership lists furnish states with another means of controlling
advocacy of an ideology. Although these statutes may apply indiscriminately
to all political associations, 75 their burden will fall more probably than not on
those organizations disapproved by the state.7 6 Associations in political favor
can reveal the names of members without jeopardizing their welfare, but
organizations representing unpopular minorities risk subjecting the persons
identified as members to official and private sanctions ranging from loss of
public employment and economic boycotts to violence.77 In the face of such
sanctions, the association can expect a loss of existing and potential member-
ship resulting in a weakening of political effectiveness. It is not surprising,
meeting) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (possibility of crime and an-
noyance from soliciting door to door does not justify restraint) ; Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (clean streets and good appearance do not justify restraining distribution
of circulars).
In the case of exclusion of a foreign corporation, the restraint is total and other means
cannot be employed to disseminate ideas in that state. Therefore, the purpose would have
to be greater than in most cases.
Relevant analogies may be drawn from cases discussing the power of states to affect
interstate commerce. In general, a state may not require a foreign corporation to secure a
license or permit to transact business which is in interstate commerce. Sioux Remedy Co.
v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914) ; Barrett v. New York, 232 U.S. 14 (1914) ; International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910) ; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). As
in the First Amendment cases the protection of interstate commerce is not absolute; it is
often necessary to balance the goal of uniformity in interstate commerce against the sub-
stantiality of the local purpose. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761 (1945).
75. See LA. REv. STAT. § 12:401-5 (Supp. 1955) requiring membership lists of every
type of organization, incorporated and unincorporated and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-48 to 55
(Supp. 1955) requiring membership lists of all organizations influencing legislation or
public opinion. There is indication however that the Louisiana statute is not actually in-
voked against all of the organizations included within its language. Jennings v. Lester,
76 So. 2d 91 (La. 1954) (law enacted primarily to regulate Ku Klux Klan). If the statute
is discriminately applied other constitutional problems are raised. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (denied permits to operate laundry to persons of
Chinese origin) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935) (exclusion of Negroes from
jury).
76. Indeed, the Ku Klux Klan was the target of "non-discriminatory" statutes requir-
ing identification of membership lists. See Jennings v. Lester, mupra note 75 (Louisiana
registration statute).
77. The Georgia Board of Education has threatened to revoke the license of any
teacher who remains a member of the NAACP, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1955, p. 13, col. 3,
although the order was subsequently modified leaving the matter to local authorities, id.,
Aug. 16, 1955, p. 25, col. 2. See statement of Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the
NAACP, that NAACP members have been "subjected to economic pressure and personal
threats and acts of violence." Id., July 26, 1956, p. 11., cols. 3-4.
In Louisiana and South Carolina membership in the NAACP by government employees,
including teachers, is illegal. Southern School News, Jan. 1957, p. 2, col. 1.
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therefore, that the NAACP, an organization particularly disfavored by domi-
nant groups in the South, has generally refused to reveal its membership lists.78
Precedent might on first impression support a statute requiring identifica-
tion of members in political organizations as a valid exercise of regulatory
power. In Bryant v. Zimmerman,79 decided in 1928, the Supreme Court held
that a state could compel a local unincorporated chapter of the Ku Klux Klan
to reveal its members. Attacked on due process grounds, the statute was found
"not arbitrary or oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be of real effect."80
The Court felt that the restrictive effect of the statute would be socially desir-
able, since the regulation tended to discourage criminal activity.8 '
Although the Court's reasoning supports state control, its thrust is seriously
undercut by later cases pointing to the deterrent effect of identification on free
speech,8 2 a factor unmentioned in Bryant. Even if the deterrence resulting from
disclosure is actually effected by private rather than legal sanctions, registration
is unconstitutional unless strictly related to a substantial public purpose.
8 3
78. See note 6 supra. In New Orleans where the risk of private sanctions is minimal,
the local branch has decided to register. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1956, p. 16, col. 4.
79. 278 U.S. 63 (1928). The statute in question required registration of oath-bound
organizations with over twenty members, and then exempted all well known oath-bound
organizations except the Klan from its purview. Id. at 63, 73.
80. Id. at 72. It is not clear whether the violation of due process alleged was a depriva-
tion of free speech. But the Court did not treat it as such: "The relator's contention under
the due process clause is that the statute deprives him from exercising his right of mem-
bership in the association." Ibid.
The statute was also attacked as a denial of equal protection of law and found consti-
tutional. Id. at 77.
81. Id. at 72. The Court did not note that the exposure of names might also have a
deterrent effect on free speech. The explanation for this oversight may lie in the state
court's finding that the Klan engaged substantially in terrorizing other individuals. Id. at
75. Or perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that this was the period before the Supreme
Court was willing to challenge the balance between free speech and police powers struck
by a state. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), with De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
See also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (Federal Corrupt Practices
Act; no First Amendment issue) ; Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)
(disclosure requirement of Postal Law). See, generally, Smith, Democratic Control of
Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure, 6 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 27 (1942).
82. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954) (narrow construction of
Regulation of Lobbying Act) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (narrow
interpretation of resolution authorizing investigation of lobbying) ; American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (non-Communist oath requirement); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration of labor organizer) ; Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (registration pro-
vision of Subversive Activities Control Act realistically restricts expression), rev'd on
other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955). But see United States v. Peace Information Center,
97 F. Supp. 255, 262 (D.D.C. 1951) (Foreign Agents Registration Act).
83. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950):
".... indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes. A
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Thus, in Thomas v. Collins 8 4 the Supreme Court held that a union organizer
could not be required to register as a condition to addressing a group of
workers. In United States v. Harriss 85 the Court held that a necessity for
evaluation of pressures upon Congress justified the registration of all persons
receiving or expending money "to influence directly or indirectly the passage
or defeat of legislation by Congress."8 6 The Court, however, restricted the act
to persons making direct representations to Congress because application to
organizations seeking to propagandize the general public might violate the First
Amendment.8 7 Recently, a lower court held that an organization claiming to
be within the class exempted from the lobbying law by Harriss may be required
to file membership lists under another statute.8 Finding that the Communist
Party presented a clear and present danger of violent overthrow of the govern-
ment and could therefore be outlawed, the court upheld the disclosure pro-
visions of the Subversive Activities Control Act.
State statutes requiring membership lists from all political associations raise
the very constitutional issue avoided by Harriss and not presented by the Com-
mnunist Party case. These statutes are not aimed at a specific organization con-
sidered to be a threat to the security of the public. Rather, they exert their
restraining force on any organization with unorthodox principles. In accord-
ance with a current trend, courts could refuse to determine whether these
statutes are unconstitutional on their face; instead they could confine their
inquiry to whether the statutes are unconstitutional as applied to the particular
organization refusing to register.8 9 But this adjudication would not relieve the
deterrent effect of registration on organizations not represented in the proceed-
ings. For until the constitutionality of applying the statute to the particular
organization is determined, persons must act at their peril in joining. Thus,
requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear
identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature."
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953) (disclosure of individuals who influence public through pamphleteering).
84. 323 U.S. 516,539 (1945):
"Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave and immediate danger
to an interest the state is entitled to protect, are not instruments of harm which
require previous identification of the speakers. And the right either of workmen or
of unions ... to assemble and discuss their own affairs is as fully protected as the
right of . . . political party members ......
85. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
86. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 STAT. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261, 266-67
(1952). (Emphasis added.)
87. 347 U.S. at 621, 626.
88. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955) (remanded to Board for reconsidera-
tion in light of new evidence) ; Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987.
50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 787 (1952).
89. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) ; American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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activities of associations will be restrained even in cases where direct applica-
tion of registration statutes would be declared unconstitutional. Because of this
indiscriminate effect, statutes requiring membership lists from all political asso-
ciations violate the First Amendment, whether or not they are constitutional
as applied to a particular association. 0
However, constitutional limitations on state power to interfere with free
speech do not immunize associations engaging in lawful advocacy from all
demands for the production of information. For example, state statutes requir-
ing foreign corporations to designate an agent for service of process fulfill a
legitimate purpose in facilitating enforcement of legal rights by residents.91
But these statutes need not, and hence cannot, be implemented by a require-
ment that the association furnish a list of local members to determine whether
registration of an agent is mandatory.92 The Supreme Court has also noted
that in the interest of safeguarding the public from fraud, states may require
public solicitors of funds to produce credentials from the group they purport
to represent.93 This purpose may also be effectuated without requiring the
names of members of the solicitor's association or of those whom he enlists in
his cause.94
But the fact that a warrant for identification can be found in one of the many
state regulatory powers should not by itself determine constitutionality. A
court order, such as was recently issued against the NAACP in Georgia, re-
quiring the production of records for tax investigation, exemplifies this type
of problem. 5 Such a demand may be necessary to determine whether an or-
90. Where statutes exert a restraining influence on protected as well as unprotected
speech, the Supreme Court has found them unconstitutional on their face. E.g., Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-99 (1939);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1937).
If a corporation is compelled to register, it should have standing to assert an abridg-
ment of First Amendment rights. See notes 10-29 supra and accompanying text.
91. All states have such requirements. 17 FLETCHER, CYCL. Corp. § 8455 (1932). In
order to be required to register a corporation must be "doing business" within the state.
Moreover if a corporation has certain minimum contacts with a state it may be subjected
to in personam jurisdiction, whether or not it has registered an agent. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See,
generally, Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process,
104 U. PA. L. Rzv. 381 (1955).
So long as these statutes are limited to registration of information and do not confer
the power to deny the right to do business they are constitutional as to political corpora-
tions. See notes 55-74 supra and accompanying text.
92. Alabama has demanded the membership lists of the NAACP incident to determin-
ing whether they are doing business under the foreign corporation laws. See note 6 supra.
93. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (dictum) ; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
94. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540-41. (1945) the Court held that the solicita-
tion of funds may be subject to reasonable regulation so long as the right to free speech
is not interfered with.
95. Williams, Rev. Comm'r of Georgia v. NAACP, reported in Southern School
News, Dec. 1956, p. 10, col. 1. The grounds for the order were that the NAACP had
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ganization claiming exemption from state taxation as a nonprofit organization
is distributing earnings to members. 0 Yet it is apparent that the order may
also be a means of obtaining a list of members and contributors for the purpose
of extra-legal sanctions. Unless such blacklisting of unpopular groups can be
prevented, decisions protecting the members of an association from other types
of punishment or prior restraint will serve merely as invitations to accomplish
the forbidden end through investigatory powers.
97
In order to prevent an improper use of regulation, the Supreme Court has
in the past probed the purposes of state action. In Grosjean v. American Press
Co.95 the Court ruled that an excise tax on advertising in newspapers with a
circulation over a certain amount was unconstitutional as a "deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guarantees."00 Dis-
daining the stated purpose of the tax, 0 the Court took judicial notice that the
tax was not one of the "ordinary forms of taxation for the support of govern-
ment."' 0'
neither filed a state income tax return nor applied for tax exemption. The court order
banning the NAACP in Texas contains a finding that the NAACP was a profit-making
organization that had evaded state taxes. Southern School News, Nov. 1956, p. 8, col. 2.
But see opinion of Jacob K. Javits, Attorney General of New York State, that the NAACP
and its legal division can be properly classified as nonprofit organizations, 1 RAcE RELA-
Tio s L. REP. 1164 (1956).
96. A normal requirement for tax exempt status under state and federal law is that
net earnings not inure to the benefit of shareholders or other private individuals. See,
e.g., INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 501 (c) (3) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3105 (c) (Supp. 1955).
The records of an organization's total income, including dues from members, may be
necessary to determine whether this requirement has been satisfied. Even if such an in-
vestigation could be conducted without obtaining the names of members paying the dues,
the record books will ordinarily contain this information. Moreover, a state may wish to
question members to determine whether they are actually receiving dividends from the
organization.
97. On the effectiveness of exposure as a deterrent to free speech, see notes 77-78
supra and accompanying text.
98. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See notes 10-29 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of cases holding that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the due process
clause. The First Amendment limitation on the taxing power may be unique: "unless
there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are without authority to limit the
exercise of the taxing power." United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953) (federal
"bookie" tax held not to violate the Tenth Amendment).
99. 297 U.S. at 250. Louisiana had imposed a 2% tax on advertising in newspapers
with a circulation of over 20,000 copies per week.
100. The purpose of the tax was alleged to be the raising of revenue for the support
of the government. See Argument for Appellees, id. at 236.
101. Id. at 250-51. The Court stated:
"In view of the persistent search for new subjects of taxation, it is not without
significance that, with the single exception of the Louisiana statute, so far as we
can discover, no state during one hundred fifty years of our national existence has
undertaken to impose a tax like that now in question."
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Aware that identification also imperils free speech, courts should require
states to exhaust all other enforcement methods that would not effect such
restrictions. 0 2 If alternatives do not exist, the courts should then consider
whether the state's interest in the information warrants the risk to free
speech.' 0 3 Finally, where the public purpose served by identification outweighs
the deterrent effect on protected activities, the courts must nevertheless be
assured that disclosure be employed solely for the approved purpose. If the
state court does not fulfill this responsibility, and the organization can prove
102. For a discussion of the least restrictive abridgment approach in the context of
prior restraints, see notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 91-93 supra
and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the theory, see Comment, 65 YAi.x
L.J. 1159, 1173-75 (1956).
103. Concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927), Justice
Brandeis stated that "prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that
it would be inappropriate as the means of averting a relatively trivial harm to society." In
his view the Court would be the judge of the gravity of the harm. The Court has adopted
this role of quantitatively appraising the public interest in a regulatory measure, even in
cases involving indirect abridgments of free speech resulting from the denial of a privilege.
See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950) :
"In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of the statute
upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional
determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm
to interstate commerce."
If a state's power to levy a tax is limited by the First Amendment, Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), certainly the power to investigate observance of tax
laws is so limited. A court may conclude that under certain circumstances the risk to free
speech inherent in revelation of records containing members' names outweighs a state's
interest in discovering whether a political association is observing the tax laws. This
would be especially true if the group is so vulnerable to the dominant opinion in the com-
munity that exposure of members would be fatal to its operations, and if the revenue-
producing activities of the organization appear such that any tax liability would be
minimal.
Compulsory production of records for tax investigation may also constitute a violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination, a guarantee included within the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). See
Kostelanetz, Bill of Rights Not Repealed for Taxpayers, 34 TAxEs 16, 17 (1956). But
the Supreme Court has held that the privilege neither shields certain records required to
be kept by law, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947) (records required by OPA),
nor obtains to corporations or quasi-corporate private associations, United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944) (records of labor union must be surrendered by custodian). See
Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 18 U. Cmi. L. REv. 687 (1951.). Although these holdings may foreclose Fifth
Amendment protection against demands for the records of a political association, they
should not stand in the way of First Amendment protection. For in view of the paramount
inportance of the First Amendment to an open political process and the relatively in-
significant number of profit-making organizations that would be entitled to First Amend-
ment protection of records, the balance between individual rights and state interest in law
enforcement need not be the same as in Fifth Amendment cases. On the priority of con-
stitutional rights, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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that membership lists are being used for the purpose of subjecting its members
to sanctions, federal protection must be forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
The absence of clearly defined limitations upon state power to regulate
political associations is attributable more to self-restraint in not employing this
power than to the inadequacies of the Constitution. If, as in the case of the
NAACP, states begin to invoke this power, First Amendment limitations will
be drawn. Neither the traditional commerce powers to grant incorporation
and to banish foreign corporations, nor the more novel powers to require
identification of members, can be used to impair political activities under the
guise of regulation.
